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Democracy not lost?  
Functional democracy  





The interwar period witnessed fierce criticism of the ways in which parliamentary democracies were 
operating in Europe. In many instances, authoritarian regimes replaced perceived malfunctioning 
democracies shortly after the ratification of democratic constitutions. Yet, many European 
intellectuals and politicians believed democracy was not entirely lost. Amidst the perceived crisis 
of democracy in Europe, one strand of intellectuals started to rethink the capacities of political 
representation and democratic governance, taking their cue from institutional innovations that 
incorporated group interests in state governance. Based on a range of representative councils 
installed in the 1920s, notions of ‘functional democracy’ were presented as a panacea for the 
crisis of European parliamentary democracy. This paper discusses the scope and impact of this 
strand of interwar political thought, alluding to the potential historical implications with regard to 
functional counter-balances within democratic governance in the face of the crises of democracy 
occurring in Europe today.
Keywords
democratic crisis, functional democracy, interwar Europe, political history
The emergence of parliamentary democracy and the re-corporatization of society, par-
ticularly in the guise of the emergence of modern trade unions, have been quintessential 
to the make-up of modern political institutions and praxis since the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Representative government and parliamentarism became key tenets of electoral 
democracy, whereas newly organized societal interests emerged as significant stakehold-
ers in public affairs. Both developments went through a critical juncture in Europe after 
the First World War. Party politics and constitutionally defined democratic polities were 
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promulgated throughout Europe, whereas organized interests (e.g. trade unions, interest 
groups, cooperatives, citizens’ organizations) were increasingly accepted as co-actors in 
many realms of state governance and public policy-making.
As such, the 1920s witnessed a series of definitive changes in the relations between 
state and society in Europe, the process to which Jürgen Habermas has referred as the 
dual – and dialectic – process of ‘societal-ization’ of the state and ‘state-ification’ of 
society (1989). It was only after – and partly also during – the First World War that the 
mutual reliance and interdependence of state and organized social interests became 
widely accepted in political, economic and social thought and practice (Romein, 1976: 
369–70).
The first development, the widespread realization or consolidation of parliamentary 
democracy, became subject to fundamental doubt and contestation shortly after the 
Paris peace treaties. Brief euphoria about parliamentary democracy in the early 1920s 
was soon overshadowed by widespread criticism of the institutions and praxis of repre-
sentative government and parliamentarism. Both functional as well as ideological cri-
tiques of proportional representation, constitutionally defined liberties, parliamentary 
decision-making, party politics and weak executive powers fed into an irreversible host 
of amendments, complete reforms and rejections of the democratic polity throughout 
Europe (Mazower, 1998: 1–39).
However, and in strong contrast to parliamentary democracy, the second develop-
ment, the establishment of organized societal interests as partners in (democratic) state 
governance, was perceived as a potential solution to – not a cause of – democratic crisis. 
Yet, historiography particularly stresses the intellectual and political discourses on the 
perceived shortcomings and limitations of representative government and parliamenta-
rism in Europe during the interwar period – and the subsequent, mostly anti-democratic, 
solutions proposed by socialist, conservative, fascist or authoritarian commentators. This 
article, however, highlights a reformist discourse, which centres on the inclusion of soci-
etal group interests in democratic governance praxis. Functional democracy, the notion 
that societal functions, not merely individuals, are constituent parts of the demos and 
should be entitled to participate in decision-making regarding public affairs, became a 
reformist trope that did not reject democracy altogether but tried to remedy its alleged 
shortcomings by proposing a second trajectory of democratic state governance, along-
side parliamentary decision-making.
Modes of functional democracy were not merely intellectual exercises. In the 1920s, 
myriad institutional settings increasingly provided for a playground within which soci-
etal interests and groups were included in various aspects of state governance. Key to 
these institutional settings were the national (socio-) economic councils that were estab-
lished in almost all European countries. These councils embodied the institutional entan-
glement between state and society, comprising interest groups such as trade unions, 
industrialists, shopkeepers and voluntary associations, but also state representatives and 
officials. By interpreting these (socio-)economic councils as institutional and intellectual 
attempts to buttress European democracies from within, this article sheds a new light on 
interwar conceptions of democratic reform. Moreover, it highlights a particular institu-
tional nexus as a significant environment of extra-parliamentary democratic praxis, 
thereby transcending the predominant (neo-) corporatist framework of interpretation.
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This article will first present some key intellectual reflections on and institutional set-
tings of the national economic councils in interwar Europe, which should be interpreted 
as attempts to rethink democratic practice and institutional design in terms of ‘functional 
democracy’, without doing away with democracy altogether. Then a brief outline of the 
trans-national (in the sense of beyond the national framework) ramifications of func-
tional democracy will be given, to disclose how group-based extra-parliamentary politi-
cal representation and participation fostered ideas about transnational democratic 
governance in Europe too. The conclusion will elaborate on some of the main findings.
The political representation of society beyond parliament
In general, the interwar years should be read as an experimental interlude during which 
newly established European democracies struggled to find a status quo without having, 
as Mark Mazower puts it, ‘any indigenous tradition of democracy’ (1998: 25). At the 
same time, pre-existing democracies had a hard time reconciling new social demands 
and realities with the expansion of suffrage and partisan politics. Generally, liberal 
democracy and parliamentarism were heavily criticized throughout Europe, which either 
nurtured a backlash to anti-liberal, authoritarian regimes (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Finland, 
Austria, Portugal) or prompted reformist thought about the institutional design of repre-
sentative democracy (e.g. Weimar Germany, France, the Low Countries, Britain, 
Czechoslovakia). Whether stressing the lack of efficacy (and efficiency) of parliamen-
tary decision-making, the perceived dangers of mass democracy and party politics, or the 
inability of the democratic state to legislate and govern according to a clearly articulated 
common good, reform – or revolution for that matter – seemed imperative to many.
One strand of criticism explicitly took the increased interdependency of state and 
society as a point of departure to rethink the institutional design of democratic govern-
ance. Against the backdrop of emerging critiques of the institutions and foundations of 
parliamentary democracy and liberal constitutionalism, the interdependency of state and 
society became a trope within reformist discourse. This interdependency, however, was 
not to be secured within existing institutions of parliamentary deliberation or representa-
tive government by regulating electoral democracy. Rather, the entanglement between 
state and society should be organized outside parliament.
In this current of thought, representative democracy became detached from its exclu-
sive equation with electoral practice, parliamentarism and individual political rights. 
Instead, societal groups and interests were seen as a starting point for rethinking demo-
cratic practice and institutional design outside of parliamentary decision-making, as 
opposed to other, much-echoed remedies, such as strengthening the executive, creating 
electoral thresholds and doing away with democracy altogether.
The most feasible expression of the reformist capacity that was attributed to organized 
interest groups in the early twentieth century was the widespread creation of national 
bodies (councils in most cases) comprised of social and economic interests, which were 
included in decision- and policy-making procedures throughout Europe and beyond. In 
some cases, such as Weimar Germany, pre-Pilsudski Poland and interwar Czechoslovakia, 
these councils could potentially, according to constitutional law, develop into full legisla-
tive bodies, alongside the elected parliament. In most cases, such as in France, Belgium, 
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the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, consultative and advisory capacities were 
vested in these councils. Obviously, in fascist Italy, the Austrian Ständesstaat and the 
Estado Novo in Portugal, these bodies of interest group representatives and experts 
replaced electoral democracy, partisan politics and parliament altogether.
In scholarly analyses these national economic and social councils (e.g. the German 
Vorläufige Reichswirtschaftsrat of 1920, the French Conseil national économique of 
1925, and the British Economic Advisory Council of 1930) have been subsumed under 
various conceptual headers: corporatism (i.e. the degree to which the central state reg-
ulates socio-economic life by involving state-approved organized interests and exper-
tise), the democratization of industry and the economy (i.e. the degree to which 
organized interests obtained a say in industrial management and governance) or, 
closely related, the reconciliation of labour and capital through multipartite bargaining 
and deliberation.
However, as more recent scholarship argues, the lenses of political economy and 
(neo-)corporatism tend to blur the more fundamental impact on democratic thought and 
practice these representative bodies had during the mid-twentieth century. By looking at 
the nexus of national (socio-)economic councils in interwar Europe as part of a set of 
governance practices of consultation, deliberation, legislation and regulation, alternative 
conceptions of representative democracy come to the fore, showing how they were pre-
sented as solutions to existing shortcomings in the institutional design and praxis of 
democracy. These conceptions amounted to notions of ‘functional democracy’, an alter-
native political democracy in which the tenets of electoral democracy, party politics and 
parliamentarism were substituted by group representation. This postulated an organiza-
tion of society along the lines of ‘functions’ (i.e. vocations and trades) and a socio-eco-
nomic definition of the common good. Moreover, as this paper will address, functional 
democracy appealed to notions about establishing transnational forms of democratic 
governance too, thereby trying to overcome what the German economist Moritz Bonn in 
1925 called ‘the crisis of European life’ (1925: 84). As such, national economic councils, 
composed of representatives of organized interest groups, reinforced and spurred on cur-
rents of political thought and practice that defined inclusionary participatory politics 
beyond the categories of the individual, the party or elected parliament.
Realities and imaginaries of functional democracy in 
interwar Europe
The ratification of new national constitutions in the late 1910s and early 1920s went hand 
in hand with the emergence of a new locus of political representation: the extra-parlia-
mentary national (socio-)economic councils. Increasingly perceived as a second circuit 
of representative government, alongside the elected parliament these councils were pre-
sented as the panacea for a series of alleged failures of parliamentary democracy. Vesting 
consultative and legislative powers in economic councils would counter the limited 
implementation of socio-economic reforms due to the lack of parliamentary consensus. 
Moreover, by having societal group interests represented in state governance, a ‘func-
tional’ definition of the common good would replace parliament’s inability to determine 
a clearly articulated general will of the nation.
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The idea of national economic councils was not new – in fact it was also integrated in 
many restorative beliefs that emphasized the role of functional or organic groups in 
decentralized decision-making throughout the nineteenth century. Yet, the institutional 
experiment and the concomitant debates about them reinvigorated the debate about an 
alternative nexus of democratic governance.
Whereas the changes in democratic and political thought in the period 1870–1940 
have received ample scholarly attention, the institutional and practical experience with 
economic councils during the interwar period has been treated rather one-sidedly in the 
historiography. The institutional configurations in question have mainly been addressed 
in the literature on the history of industrial relations and – in the wake of Philippe 
Schmitter’s seminal article ‘Still the century of corporatism?’ (1974) – neo-corporatism. 
Generally, scholars implicitly set post-1945 tripartite welfare capitalism as a benchmark 
for pre-war achievements, and then proceed to employ a rather linear historical narrative 
of failure, highlighting the limited significance of conciliatory, consultative or bargain-
ing institutions with representative structures during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Middlemas, 1979; Berger, 1981; Maier, 
1975; Scholten, 1987; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Cawson, 1985a; Crouch, 1993; 
Berger and Compston, 2002; Crouch and Streeck, 2006; Davids et al., 2007). Interwar 
antecedents of post-1945 institutions of welfare capitalism have thus been incorporated 
in a rather unproblematic and normative analysis of state–society rapprochement, in 
most cases subscribing uncritically to the neo-corporatist research paradigm of the late 
twentieth century. An important exception here is the work of Peter Katzenstein on cor-
poratism in small European states. He states that students of political science should 
study parliamentary democracy and corporatist schemes as interconnected constituents 
of a political system: ‘[The] essence of democratic corporatism lies in its alignment of a 
territorially based parliamentary system of representation with a particular functional 
representation of interest groups’ (Katzenstein, 1985: 137).
However, whereas many authors recognize the coexistence of ‘pluralist politics and 
parliamentary forms’ on the one hand, and ‘corporatist politics and functional representa-
tion’ on the other, with regard to post-war (mainly Western and Northern) Europe, lim-
ited, if any, reference is made to preceding (pre-war) constellations amounting to a 
similar if more fragmented complex of coexisting and converging institutions (Cawson, 
1985b: 133). Only for France, and to a lesser extent Belgium, have elaborate accounts 
been published that transcend the framework of mere neo-corporatist interpretation, 
meaning, broadly, state-controlled conciliatory schemes in which employers’ and work-
ers’ representatives discussed a range of socio-economic issues (Kaplan and Minard, 
2004; Rosanvallon, 1998; Luyten, 1992, 1993). The work of the French historian Alain 
Chatriot (2002) in particular, whose analysis connects to the remarkable multi-volume 
non-Jacobinist interpretations of French democracy by Pierre Rosanvallon (1998), offers 
an excellent illustration of how to integrate socio-economic councils into the history of 
representative government, political representation and participation, a case in point 
being the French Conseil national économique (CNE), created in 1925. Chatriot eschews 
the projection of contemporary, late-capitalist concerns onto early twentieth-century 
institutions. Instead he shows that the CNE was imagined as an alternative form of politi-
cal representation. This analysis can be extended to other national economic councils, 
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which were both the expression, as well as the catalysts, of a series of experiments with 
alternative modes of political representation and participation in interwar Europe.
In peacetime, permanent dialogues were established between the government, its 
executive branches, and the councils and boards into which organized interests were 
increasingly clustered during the late 1920s and 1930s, accumulating until they became 
what Charles S. Maier (1987) has described as pyramids of interest representation. 
During the interwar period intellectuals reflected on these ‘pyramids’, increasingly 
expressing awareness of their impact on the institutional organization of government, 
democracy and political representation.
Ultimately, governments at all levels had to accede, mostly reluctantly, to the pres-
sures exerted on parliamentary democracy by a ‘new corporative collusion’ (Eley, 2002: 
221). An illustrative case is the manifestation of the local state as an employer of blue- 
and white-collar workers who, in the course of the twentieth century, came to be repre-
sented in various participatory schemes ranging from collective bargaining to full-blown 
workplace democracy or self-management. These and similar overtures resulted in a 
renegotiated, modified social contract, entailing not only an enlarged franchise and the 
appreciation of trade unions and voluntary associations as partners in policy-making, but 
also the acceptance of extra-parliamentary avenues of political representation and par-
ticipation. According to one interwar commentator, ‘a network of industrial committees 
and economic boards [was created] which not only paralleled the political structure, but 
assumed great practical importance’ (Lorwin, 1931: 6). Consequently, debates about 
extra-parliamentary political representation and participation within the intermediate 
structures between state and society, and, on a slightly higher level of abstraction, dis-
cussing the conceptual link with parliamentary democracy became ever more concrete 
from the 1920s onwards.
Initiated by either state intervention or by bottom-up self-regulation, many interwar 
arrangements echoed critiques of the liberal tenets of parliamentary democracy. Such 
non-liberal strands of thought, which surfaced from the mid-nineteenth century onwards 
in many philosophical and ideological guises ranging roughly across social Catholicism, 
German organic state theory, Anglo-Saxon pluralist thought, notions of corporatism and 
collectivism and forms of council democracy, have been subjects for scholarly debate 
and production for decades (Bowen, 1947; Elbow, 1953; Black, 2003; Stears, 2002; 
Runciman, 1997; Williamson, 1985). Cécile Laborde (2000) cogently captures the 
essence of this body of ideas by sketching a shift from dichotomous liberal thought 
(state–individual) to trichotomous considerations (state–group–individual) in demo-
cratic theory.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many intellectuals indeed 
appealed to the ‘group basis of politics’, a phrase coined by Earl Latham (1952) meaning 
a widely spread preference for groups, either organically composed (such as families or 
religious communities) or constituted by economic or societal function – in the vein of 
Saint-Simon – over individuals as the basic cells of democratic politics. As Marc Stears 
(2010: 44–54) argues, even American Progressives conceptualized an alternative strand 
of democratic politics, promoting a particular kind of industrial democracy in which 
individual representation was subordinate to occupational representation from the late 
1910s onwards. Similar considerations from the National Planning Board in the United 
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States reached President Roosevelt in 1934, in a report that proclaimed that extra-parlia-
mentary councils ‘exerted a useful influence in bringing together various interests and in 
inducing a general rather than a special point of view in the nation’ (National Planning 
Board, 1934: 28). In effect then, the production of some sort of common good was no 
longer conceived of as exclusively the result of rational deliberation by an elected assem-
bly of individuals.
Trichotomous considerations of democracy found expression in a plethora of intel-
lectual reflections on the crisis of dichotomous democracy. In 1906, the legal philoso-
pher Georg Jellinek had already pointed to the discrepancy between the ideal type of 
parliamentary democracy and representative government and its actual practice, stating 
that ‘eine Beschränkung der parlamentarischen Macht’ (‘a restriction of parliamentary 
power’) (1906: 76) was inevitable in the long run. Jellinek had seen that in many coun-
tries legislative initiative was partly transferred to the executive, and the content of pol-
icy-making was more and more displaced from parliament into extra-parliamentary 
institutions – in Jellinek’s terms, ‘Spezialparlamente’ – in which experts and interest 
groups were involved in the practice of interest conciliation, policy study and adjusting 
plans in close connection with officials from ministerial departments.
The French legal philosopher Maurice Hauriou introduced the term ‘l’administration 
consultative’ (‘consultative administration’) in 1927 (1975: 115). To him this was a 
third modality of administration, next to ‘administration exécutive’ (government) and 
‘administration délibérante’ (parliament), which manifested itself primarily in the 
national economic and social councils of Europe. Hauriou thus extended the trias 
politica by articulating a clear realm of political action for societal interest groups 
within state governance.
The political scientist Fritz Nova defined Hauriou’s ‘administration consultative’, 
embodied by the national economic councils, as an additional sphere in democratic 
politics. Nova, who migrated to the US before Hitler’s rise to power, was a fierce 
proponent of what he called the ‘supplement to political representation’, i.e. the estab-
lishment of ‘a permanent, national, non-political, advisory economic council’ which 
would supply the executive and parliament with ‘the experience, the ideas, and the 
recommendations of the economic interests of the country’ (cited in Talbot, 1951: 
162–3). To Nova the authoritarian experiences with ‘corporativism’ in Italy, Portugal 
and Germany in essence had nothing to do with the instrument of functional represen-
tation within a democratic polity. Yet other, non-authoritarian experiences, for 
instance with the Reichswirtschaftsrat of the Weimar Republic, could serve as exam-
ple institutions to be implemented in democratic polities, particularly in the United 
States (Nova, 1950).
In 1923, the British political scientist Herman Finer distinguished a theoretical and a 
practical movement that responded to the perceived crisis of representative government 
in Europe. According to Finer, the theorists envisaged various new polities in which 
political competences were divided among new representative bodies that would 
replace, in the case of Britain, the Upper and Lower Chambers, and would allow for the 
mirroring of society within government, the relief of parliamentary decision-making 
and new channels of socio-economic regulation (Barker, 1950: 14–22). G. D. H. Cole’s 
(1921) famous system of guild socialism, a structure of self-governing functional 
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groups (guilds) in which the state would dissolve, was among the most quoted theoreti-
cal alternatives presented in Britain.
In contrast, practical responses to the perceived crisis of representative democracy 
and government could already be witnessed in continental Europe, Finer (1923) argued. 
To Finer, the practical response amounted to the functional differentiation of government 
by means of delegation to extra-parliamentary representative bodies. The installation of 
the Vorläufige Reichswirtschaftsrat in Weimar Germany was exemplary to him. 
According to Finer, it reflected the elimination of ‘the territorial boundaries of the small 
locality’ in favour of a pre-eminence of ‘personal association according to occupational 
groups’ (1923: 55) in state governance.
In 1937 the exiled German philosopher, Karl Loewenstein, also witnessed an omni-
present advance of extra-parliamentary representative socio-economic institutions dur-
ing the two decades following the First World War. The function of those institutions, 
Loewenstein noted, stretched from ‘merely consultative powers’ to ‘full political pow-
ers’ (1937: 420–31, 529–30) similar to those of parliaments. The advisory capacity of 
these socio-economic bodies, he continued, manifested itself most fully in Weimar 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, but was also discernible in many traits throughout Western 
and Central Europe. To varying extents, fully fledged socio-economic parliaments were 
established in fascist Italy, Portugal and Austria, but, in Loewenstein’s reading, moderate 
elements of those fascist or corporatist constellations also existed in Northern and 
Western European countries.
Whereas Loewenstein remained sceptical of the democratic potential of national 
economic councils, the Romanian minister and intellectual Mihaïl Manoïlesco favour-
ably proclaimed ‘le siècle du corporatisme’ (‘the century of corporatism’) (1936). To 
Manoïlesco, corporatism, of which he conceptualized a singular subtype (‘corporatisme 
subordonné’) to refer to fascist Italy, had begun to substitute the postulations of liberal-
ism and socialism as the foundations of political and social organization from the 1920s 
onwards (Schmitter, 1974: 117–28). He characterized the current state of affairs as ‘cor-
poratisme mixte’ (mixed corporatism), a situation in which functionally defined bodies 
were at best equated with, but mostly subordinate to, a territorially defined representa-
tive assembly, i.e. elected national parliaments. In time, however, corporatism, accord-
ing to him, would inevitably hamper the maturing of parliamentary democracy and 
eventually replace political systems rooted in nineteenth-century liberal democratic 
thought. He envisaged a future constellation of ‘corporatisme pur’ (pure corporatism). 
In this stage, all corporations would be autonomous in their own functional domain; the 
state, in Manoïlesco’s system, ought to be the corporation involved in the activities of 
defence and law and order. In other words, Manoïlesco foresaw the emergence of a new 
political system that would rely on forms of functional representation to compose its 
governing bodies.
Which interwar institutions prompted the reflections of Hauriou, Nova, Loewenstein 
and Manoïlesco on functional representation and democracy? With hindsight, and sup-
ported by a vast body of quantitative material from several European countries, the polit-
ical scientist Colin Crouch states in his admirable study, Industrial Relations and 
European State Traditions, that ‘an institutional snapshot of 1919 would demonstrate an 
extraordinary general shift towards unambiguously corporatist institutions’ (1993: 127). 
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Though varying in task, composition and authority, Europe indeed witnessed an enor-
mous outburst of extra-parliamentary bodies with representative capacities in the imme-
diate aftermath of the First World War. During the mid- and late 1920s extra-parliamentary 
institutions ‘thickened up’ and a series of new arrangements emerged, reflecting a trend 
towards more complex consultation and bargaining structures in which officials from 
ministerial departments, experts and branch-level representatives – both employees and 
employers – became the main actors at the national level. An inventory compiled under 
the aegis of the League of Nations shows the remarkable number of national ‘economic 
councils’ founded during the late 1910s and 1920s (Lindner, 1932: 104–9).
At the national level, the new European states were among the first to create, or con-
stitutionally define, representative multipartite socio-economic councils. In 
Czechoslovakia, an Advisory Committee for Economic Questions was established in 
1919. Initially the government appointed members, though subsequent amendments to 
the decree governing the committee resulted in a representative body that undertook a 
number of unsolicited activities and whose members were nominated by their industry 
(in the case of employers), their unions (in the case of workers), and voluntary associa-
tions including consumer, scientific and some other organizations (Lindner, 1932: 31–3). 
Ultimately, even linguistic minorities and some degree of proportional territorial repre-
sentation were taken into account in the Czechoslovakian case (Lorwin, 1931: 10).
The Polish constitution of 1921 provided for the setting up of a Supreme Economic 
Council, but its actual formation was postponed and eventually abandoned. That was 
mainly due to the fact that its constituent parts, so-called Chambers of Commerce, 
Industry, Agriculture and Transport, in which local delegates of employers and trade 
unions were to be represented, developed rather slowly due to social and political turmoil. 
In Estonia (1919), Yugoslavia (1921), Ireland (1922), Finland (1928) and Latvia (1929) 
similar initiatives had more success. In other countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
France and the Scandinavian states, pre-existing or new institutions were incorporated 
into a host of representative agencies and councils functioning at the national level.
The composition of economic councils in Europe differed in size, ranging from 20 
members in Finland to 150 in Czechoslovakia and 326 in Germany. They were diverse 
too, but again to different degrees, ranging from a detailed division between represented 
vocations and professions to a single distinction between employers and labour, and 
varied in state contribution from a single president to full ministerial representation. The 
mechanisms of selection – whether by appointment, election or nomination – and the 
extent of state control differed, depending on the authority of the institutions, which 
ranged from noncommittal advice to mandatory consent before the enactment of law, to, 
ultimately, legislative competence, as was the case in the corporatist and authoritarian 
Portugal and Austria in the 1930s. In some countries women obtained suffrage for such 
councils before they were granted the same rights for parliamentary elections. However, 
it was only in France and Germany that women actually obtained seats in the councils 
(Lorwin, 1931: 9). In general, the composition, selection mechanisms, authority and 
proximity of councils to state bureaucracy were not fixed during the interwar period: 
they were subject to continuous debate and change.
Taken together, and by looking beyond the interpretative framework of (neo-)corpo-
ratism, these national economic councils disclose a Europe-wide practice with political 
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participation and representation that transcended – or even denounced – the defining 
principles of liberal democracy. The demos, i.e. the political community, was defined as 
a composite of functional groups, not of individuals. As such, group interests were at the 
base of the political process and the body politic, from which an articulation of the com-
mon good would come. Political parties, whose outlooks were mostly informed by a 
particular political ideology, were rejected in favour of associations representing particu-
lar group or sector interests. In this way, societal interests which were not addressed in 
the politically elected legislative bodies could be represented, articulated and negotiated. 
In essence, to many, functional democracy offered an alternative avenue of democratic 
politics during the interwar period, allowing for a different means of political emancipa-
tion and participation. It was not by enlarging franchise, civil rights or citizenship that 
inclusion was promoted, but through acknowledging and including the perceived func-
tional group to which citizens belonged in the political process.
Inter- and trans-nationalizing functional democracy
After having created the National Council of Corporations, a legislative body for sectors 
such as agriculture, arts, industry, banking and transport, in fascist Italy in 1930, minister 
Giuseppe Bottai argued in favour of a global equivalent to tackle the economic crisis that 
was spreading globally. He proposed a so-called ‘World Economic Council’ under the 
aegis of the League of Nations, which would include representatives of all existing eco-
nomic councils in order to establish regulatory economic measures on a global scale (Het 
Vaderland, 1931). Bottai’s suggestion clearly reflected the anti-democratic institutional 
designs of fascist corporatism, for instance by stressing the key role of the state in deter-
mining the setup of national and international councils.
Also working from economic analysis, but with a clear democratic purpose, the 
French economist Francis Delaisi presented his idea of ‘A-Europe’ in 1929. ‘A-Europe’ 
represented a set of industrialized nation-states physically and mentally connected by the 
belief in horsepower, whereas ‘B-Europe’ stood for an agricultural Europe that was ever 
more separated from ‘A-Europe’. To Delaisi ‘le cheval-vapeur’ (horsepower) was the 
natural ally of democracy. He postulated a direct link between a horsepower-driven 
economy and democracy and even argued that cross-border functional representation 
was the best way to create Europe as a democratic and political unity (1929: 47–52).
Bottai and Delaisi’s proposals reflect how, by the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the 
national economic councils in Europe (and elsewhere) incited ideas about functional 
representation and group-based political participation beyond the national frameworks 
of reference. They also reflect how anti-democratic political thought as well as reformist 
democratic thought alluded to similar institutional configurations to achieve European or 
even global socio-economic governance.
Such ideas were neither new nor marginal. Within the fabric of the League of 
Nations, some progress had already been made with regard to assessing the interna-
tional impact of national economic councils on international collaboration and govern-
ance (Clavin and Wessel, 2005). In 1931, the economist Elli Lindner, hired by the 
League of Nations, noticed such an abundance of assemblies in which social and eco-
nomic interests were represented that she opted for ‘ein Europäisches Gremium, in 
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welchem sich die nationalen Wirtschaftsräte zu gemeinsamer Arbeit zusammenfinden 
können’ (‘a European body in which national economic councils might meet and work 
together’) (1931: 472). To some proponents of an independent international political 
economy from both ends of the political spectrum, Lindner’s suggestion endorsed their 
proposals to create the functional representation of socio-economic interests beyond 
national borders, which would bring the era of national, territorially defined and indi-
vidual-based parliamentary democracy to an end. This was not a noncommittal intel-
lectual exercise: institutional developments and increasing experience with international 
governance within the League of Nations gave practical credit to the idea of a transna-
tional functional democracy.
One of the main realms of international administration within the League of Nations 
in the interwar years was indeed industrial economy. In 1923 the temporary Joint 
Economic Committee was divided into two permanent bodies that were constituted of 
representatives of national governments: the Economic Committee and the Financial 
Committee. Both were established as inter-governmental bodies ‘that had an exclusive 
mandate to examine economic and monetary questions and to publish policy recom-
mendations aimed at the [League of Nation’s] Assembly and the Council’ (Clavin and 
Wessel, 2005: 472).
Yet, analogous to the advent of advisory and deliberative councils on the national 
level, a third committee was established in 1927: the Economic Consultative Committee 
(ECC). This is where the amalgamation of national economic councils entered the inter-
national level of governance. In contrast to the governmental representatives in the for-
mer committees, however, the ECC was designated to represent ‘industry, commerce, 
agriculture, finance, transport, labour questions and questions relative to consumption’ 
(Morley, 2007 [1932]: 614). Thus, the ECC reflected the general consent to the incorpo-
ration of economic interests into schemes of international administration. Moreover, it 
articulated a cross-border mode of functional representation. As such, it was at odds with 
the predominant state centrism within the League of Nations’ fabric in general.
Auxiliary or affiliated organizations such as the International Labour Office, the 
International Institute for Agriculture and the International Chambers of Commerce and 
Trade, were invited to think about delegates representing their group interests (labour, 
agriculture and commerce). These organizations should enable a form of functional rep-
resentation that would transcend territorial confinement. In fact, the International Labour 
Office, as the international manifestation of tripartite collaboration (between states, capi-
tal and labour), by itself can be seen as an expression of the desire to sustain and promote 
new forms of tripartite industrial capitalism. Yet, the ECC went a step further: it unleashed 
an attempt to secure an all-encompassing representation of the socio-economic domain, 
simultaneously transcending national traditions, idiosyncrasies and delineations.
Other organizations, for instance the International Union of Local Authorities, sought 
to be represented in the ECC, urging for ‘their function’ (i.e. local affairs) to be repre-
sented, but were neglected and surpassed despite laborious lobbying in the corridors of 
Geneva and Brussels. The International Union of Local Authorities considered cities (or 
their administrations) distinct from nations and their governments – as undiluted func-
tional and transnational actors par excellence. This conception rooted in a ‘transnational-
ized’ political-utopian discourse on municipal socialism that evocatively appealed to ‘a 
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world in which home-ruled cities would be the basic cells of a democratic order more 
amenable to peace, mutual understanding, and the resolution of social problems across 
national borders’ (Payre and Saunier, 2008: 78).
When using the criteria and terms manifest in existing historiography, one could 
perceive the ECC as another example of an attempt to establish a permanent structure 
of multipartite deliberation – a minor chapter in the history of industrial relations. Yet, 
the inception of and debates about the ECC reveal the international dimension of the 
emergence of deliberative, representative agencies during the interwar period. National 
debates, which had already been infused by international comparisons, were now inter-
laced with transnational arguments, regularly surfacing at League of Nations events 
during the interwar period. Consequently, the establishment of national economic 
councils throughout Europe was no longer seen as an aberration, but, moreover, was 
accepted as inevitable in re-establishing society and economies domestically as well as 
internationally.
As such, functional representation, or the presence of organized interest groups in 
representative bodies, permeated the narrative of internationalism. This offered ammuni-
tion to those sceptical about international collaboration via the League of Nations as a 
means of maintaining peace and global economic activity. At the same time, however, 
the League of Nations promoted trans-national cooperation, stimulating collaborations 
between organizations that did not necessarily represent national governments.
Conclusion
This article has only begun to address and assess interwar practices of – and intellectual 
reflections on – functional democracy through a host of national (socio-)economic coun-
cils. However, it does offer some leads from which we might probe further into the intel-
lectual and institutional history of functional democracy in interwar Europe and beyond. 
This history discloses a number of very fundamental considerations about the democratic 
polity that stretch beyond the theoretical axioms of parliamentary democracy. As such, it 
invites political theorists and historians to rethink the ‘post-liberal’ critiques on repre-
sentative government and parliamentary democracy, not by adopting the rather norma-
tive lens of (neo-)corporatist theory, but by reading the surrounding intellectual discourses 
and institutional practices as thorough adaptations of functional democracy.
One might argue that the interwar nexus of extra-parliamentary political representa-
tion and participation, revolving around national (socio-)economic councils, repre-
sents a second circuit of political representation, participation and, to some extent, 
emancipation. In this circuit the individual was replaced by functional groups as the 
basic cells of the body politic, individual elections were not perceived as a sine qua 
non for democratic politics, and socio-economic (group) interests fostered the produc-
tion of a common good. These notions were not restricted to reformist discourses and 
experiments at the national level. They translated into transnational understandings of 
the organization of European politics, particularly within the League of Nations. 
Functional democracy thus became a way of conceptualizing political collaboration in 
Europe, thereby implicitly circumventing the ever more troublesome sphere of inter-
governmentalism in the interwar period.
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Amidst the widely proclaimed crisis of interwar European democracy, the notion of 
functional democracy as a counterbalance to parliamentary democracy became an 
attractive panacea for the perceived ills of parliamentarism, party politics and repre-
sentative government, without necessarily wanting to do away with them altogether. 
Without resorting to anti-liberal or anti-democratic authoritarianism, both new and 
pre-existing democratic politics (e.g. in Weimar Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, 
France and Czechoslovakia) considered the inclusion of societal interests in state gov-
ernance, to varying degrees, as a means to consolidate democratic praxis and avert an 
authoritarian backlash.
We should primarily understand these functional counter-balances in democratic gov-
ernance within the specific historical and political context of interwar Europe. With 
today’s emphasis on the electoral method as the main source of legitimacy for individual 
political officeholders, as well as contemporary criticism of, for instance, the representa-
tiveness and the legitimacy of post-industrial consociational or neo-corporatist govern-
ance arrangements, it might be hard to see how group-based, functional democracy bears 
the capacity to sustain, rather than undermine, parliamentary democracy. Indeed, func-
tional democracy is easily denounced by pointing to its democratic or liberal deficits (it 
might assume non-electoral forms; it sees functional groups as constituent parts of the 
demos) from a contemporary perspective.
However, by taking into account a longer historical-institutionalist perspective, one 
might also argue that the parallel development of functional and parliamentary democ-
racy from the late nineteenth century onwards, with an acceleration in the interwar period 
and in the managed democracies of post-war Europe, invites us to rethink the institu-
tional configurations that have rendered democratic governance locally, nationally and 
supranationally. By looking at how functional insertions into democratic governance 
practices have served, whether discursively or legally, as counter-balances to parliamen-
tary, electoral democratic practices, new cues might present themselves for rethinking 
the curtailment of democratic backsliding or authoritarian reflexes today.
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